Finance Decoder Report

Chicago's Fiscal
Health: Decoded

A city that can't pay its bills can't invest in its future. Strong Towns calls this the solvency principle. The charts below show how Chicago’s long-term obligations have outgrown its means, with commitments made over decades and left for the next generation to pay.

Skip to the numbers or see what to ask your alderperson

Data: 2003–2025 via Chicago Annual Comprehensive Financial Reports · City government only

The Finance Decoder & #DoTheMath

Strong Towns Chicago's #DoTheMath initiative uses the Finance Decoder to chart 23 years of city financial data. We're not prescribing specific fixes here. The goal is to give everyday Chicagoans the context to ask sharper questions of their elected officials. Every budget, project, and policy should be able to answer these three questions:

01
Sustainability
"Can Chicago keep providing the services it provides today a generation from now?"
02
Flexibility
"If something unexpected hits (a recession, a disaster, a spike in costs), does Chicago have room in the budget to respond?"
03
Vulnerability
"How much of Chicago's budget depends on money from the state or federal government?"

Behind all three questions is one idea: community-first accounting, which judges each decision by whether it leaves residents better off years from now, not just today. Chicago’s budget counts this year’s cash, while the bills that grow when repairs wait and pensions come up short sit in its audited report. The results are familiar: credit downgrades, property tax fights, and budget gaps closed with more borrowing.

How did we get here?

Strong Towns founder Charles Marohn argues that cities go broke for one core reason: they build things that cost more to maintain than they'll ever produce in revenue. Chicago is no exception. Here's how the pattern plays out, and what Strong Towns says the alternative looks like:

Cities build more than they can maintain900,000 fewer residents, the same 9,000-plus miles of pipe

After World War II, American cities spread out with wide roads, parking lots, and low-density development, what Strong Towns calls “The Suburban Experiment.” That growth pays off right away, then costs more to maintain than it ever returns, so the usual answer is more new development to chase the next round of revenue.

Chicago ran a version of this on itself. Its population peaked at 3.6 million in 1950. It cleared neighborhoods for expressways and rewrote its zoning to keep new density out. Growth went to the suburbs instead, cutting Chicago from about two-thirds of the region’s residents to under a third. The pipes did not leave with them: about 900,000 fewer people now maintain the same 9,000-plus miles of water and sewer mains.

That left streets, water pipes, sewers, and streetlights deteriorating for decades. New projects come with a groundbreaking and a ribbon cutting. A repaving schedule comes with neither, which makes upkeep the easiest thing to postpone.

Short-term fixes create long-term problemsThe FY2026 budget leans on about $450 million of borrowing for operating costs

When money got tight, leaders turned to quick patches: leasing out public assets like the Skyway and the parking meters for decades in exchange for cash up front, borrowing to cover today's bills, and pushing costs into the future. Each "fix" created bigger problems down the road.

Those leases are nearly two decades old, and the habit continues. The FY2026 budget authorized roughly $1.8 billion in new borrowing, including about $450 million to cover operating costs, along with debt issued for police misconduct settlements and firefighter back pay.

Economists call this temporal discounting: tomorrow's problem always feels less urgent than today's.

Pensions followed the same pattern, at massive scale28 cents on hand for every dollar promised to retirees

For decades, state law set Chicago’s pension contributions with a formula tied to what employees paid in rather than what the benefits would cost. The city paid it. It was never enough, and the shortfall compounded. Chicago now carries roughly $36.4 billion in unfunded pension liabilities, the largest item on its balance sheet, and the catch-up now competes with services in every budget.

That formula is gone. Payments are now actuarially calculated and nearly five times what they were in 2016. Two numbers describe where that leaves the funds, and they get mixed up constantly.

  • The annual billWhat the city pays each year against the full actuarial cost. Chicago covered 27% in 2016 and 85% in 2025. Part of what is left is by design, since the law aims for 90% funding rather than paying the debt off.
  • The funded ratioWhat the funds hold against everything already promised. That is 28%, the accumulated result of the old formula.

Part of that 85% is nearly $1.1 billion the city has paid voluntarily since 2023, above what state law requires. Strip out the 2025 payment and the share falls to about 77%. Real progress, approved one budget at a time.

The alternative

The Strong Towns approach is simple in principle, even if politically difficult:

  • Maintain what you already have
  • Grow gradually, not all at once
  • Invest in things that pay for themselves

The Numbers at a Glance

Four numbers every Chicago resident should know, pulled directly from the city's 2025 Annual Comprehensive Financial Report (ACFR), released in June 2026. They cover the city government only, which is about a quarter of your property tax bill.

−$65.3B
Net financial position
Chicago owes $65.3 billion more than it has in cash and other financial assets. In 2003 the gap was $9.4 billion, about $16.5 billion in today's money.
28%
Pension funded ratio
Across its four pension funds, Chicago has 28 cents for every dollar promised to retirees. The $36.4 billion gap works out to about $13,300 per resident, or $31,400 per household.
$2.85B
Annual pension contribution
Up from $0.59 billion in 2016, a nearly fivefold increase in nine years. That's roughly one in every five dollars of city revenue, before a single service is delivered.
60%
Infrastructure value remaining
60% of the original value of Chicago's roads, pipes, and buildings is left on the books, down from 73% in 2003. No city document says what restoring them would cost.

What’s counted, and what isn’t

City government only. Schools, transit, parks and the county are not included.

The City of Chicago is roughly a quarter of your property tax bill. The Chicago Board of Education alone is more than half.

Counted: police, fire, streets, water, sewer, the airports, the Public Library and the Sales Tax Securitization Corporation.

Not counted: CPS, the CTA, the Park District, the Housing Authority, City Colleges and the Public Building Commission, which the ACFR treats as separate governments the city only appoints boards to. Nor Cook County, the Forest Preserve District or the MWRD.

Those governments carry their own debts and pension gaps, and they fall on the same households. Every figure here understates what a Chicago resident collectively owes.

What changed in the FY2025 numbers

The hole deepened by $1.6 billion, and pension funding improved on market returns
  • The hole got $1.6 billion deeper, to $65.3 billion. The city took in $15.0 billion during 2025 and ran up $16.2 billion in costs, counting the bills it added to the future as well as the ones it paid.
  • The pension funds now hold 28 cents for every dollar promised, up from 25, after a strong year in the markets. The dollar gap barely moved, from $36.5 billion to $36.4 billion.
  • Interest on the city’s debt fell to 3.4 cents of every dollar it collects, the lowest in the 23 years shown. A 2017 refinancing did most of that, replacing high-interest debt with low-interest debt.
  • Money from Springfield and Washington fell to 7% of what the city takes in, back where it was before the pandemic, as COVID relief ran out.
  • The city’s roads, pipes and buildings have 60% of their original value left on the books, down from 61%. They are wearing out faster than the city replaces them.
Sustainability

Can Chicago keep this up long-term?
01

The Bottom Line: How Deep in the Hole Is Chicago? [Net Financial Position]

Cash and financial assets (excluding roads, buildings, etc.) minus total liabilities

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Chicago's net financial position by year, in billions of dollars, shown both as a total and per resident. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearNet financial positionPer resident
2003−$9.44 billion−$3,291 per resident
2004−$10.53 billion−$3,709 per resident
2005−$11.39 billion−$4,054 per resident
2006−$13.01 billion−$4,685 per resident
2007−$14.76 billion−$5,374 per resident
2008−$16.59 billion−$6,098 per resident
2009−$18.68 billion−$6,909 per resident
2010−$20.49 billion−$7,601 per resident
2011−$22.48 billion−$8,301 per resident
2012−$25.44 billion−$9,356 per resident
2013−$27.12 billion−$9,950 per resident
2014−$29.24 billion−$10,732 per resident
2015−$55.84 billion−$20,548 per resident
2016−$58.46 billion−$21,612 per resident
2017−$58.84 billion−$21,814 per resident
2018−$59.67 billion−$22,211 per resident
2019−$59.53 billion−$22,232 per resident
2020−$60.54 billion−$22,043 per resident
2021−$59.72 billion−$22,147 per resident
2022−$62.01 billion−$23,268 per resident
2023−$62.96 billion−$23,630 per resident
2024−$63.69 billion−$23,498 per resident
2025−$65.28 billion−$23,898 per resident

What this chart shows: Everything Chicago has in the bank, minus everything it owes: pensions, bonds, and other debts. The result is negative $65.3 billion, and it got worse by roughly $1.6 billion in 2025 alone.

In 2015 the reported hole grew $26.6 billion in one year, nine times the largest move in any other year. Chicago did not borrow that money. A rule called GASB 68 began requiring cities to carry the full size of their pension promises as a liability, and decades of accumulated debt arrived on the balance sheet at once. Before that it sat in the footnotes and did not count against the bottom line.

Nothing has done the same for what the city already owns. Roads, pipes and buildings wear out the way a pension promise accrues, quietly and without a bill, and neither the audited report nor the capital plan says what restoring them would cost. Strong Towns argues that this is the infrastructure problem most cities actually have.

The two halves of this chart are measured differently, so the early years should not be read straight across to the recent ones. On the old rules the hole roughly tripled from 2003 to 2014. On the new rules it has widened in every year but two. The In 2025 dollars toggle strips out inflation.

What this means for you Closing this gap means higher taxes, lower spending, or reduced benefits. Refinancing only moves it.
That $65.3 billion gap will eventually be addressed through some combination of higher taxes, lower spending, or reduced benefits. Refinancing stretches payments out, but doesn't reduce the total owed. To meaningfully close this gap, the city would need to take in more than it spends, consistently, for many years. In 2025 the city took in $15.0 billion and booked $16.2 billion in costs, so the gap widened again. Switch the chart to per resident to compare cities of different size: Chicago's gap works out to about $23,900 per resident, against $34,200 in New York, $9,400 in Los Angeles and $5,800 in Houston.

How deep is the debt? Three more ways to measure it 3 charts
02

How Many Years Would It Take to Pay Off the Debt? [Net Debt-to-Total Revenues]

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Chicago's net debt as a multiple of annual revenue, by year. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearNet debt to revenue
20031.64× annual revenue
20041.79× annual revenue
20051.83× annual revenue
20061.95× annual revenue
20072.11× annual revenue
20082.35× annual revenue
20092.79× annual revenue
20102.91× annual revenue
20112.98× annual revenue
20123.35× annual revenue
20133.47× annual revenue
20143.59× annual revenue
20156.24× annual revenue
20166.21× annual revenue
20176.09× annual revenue
20185.77× annual revenue
20195.29× annual revenue
20205.40× annual revenue
20214.63× annual revenue
20224.83× annual revenue
20234.19× annual revenue
20244.37× annual revenue
20254.36× annual revenue
Think of it this way: If Chicago devoted every dollar of revenue to paying off debt and spent nothing else, it would take 4.4 years. The jump in 2015 is the same pension reporting change described above, not new debt. At that peak it would have taken over 6 years. For a rough sense of scale, that's like a household earning $100,000 carrying $436,000 in debt. (Cities aren't households, but the ratio gives a feel for the weight of the obligation.)
Read the fine print The ratio improved because revenue grew, not because the city paid down what it owes.
The ratio improved from 6.2x in 2015 to 4.4x by 2025 almost entirely on revenue growth, including a temporary boost from pandemic-era federal aid. Over those same years what Chicago owes, after subtracting what it holds, rose from $55.8 billion to $65.3 billion. The 2025 reading is essentially flat against 2024, and in 2003 this ratio was under 2x.
03

Could the City Cover Its Bills Tomorrow? [Financial Assets-to-Total Liabilities]

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Chicago's financial assets divided by total liabilities, by year. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearFinancial assets to liabilities
20030.448
20040.413
20050.464
20060.412
20070.377
20080.337
20090.322
20100.329
20110.321
20120.279
20130.260
20140.255
20150.153
20160.149
20170.178
20180.192
20190.194
20200.192
20210.201
20220.219
20230.234
20240.224
20250.225
Set aside physical infrastructure for a moment. Count only what Chicago has in cash, investments, and receivables, then compare that to everything it owes. The result: the city can cover about 22 cents of every dollar of its obligations with money it actually has on hand. The drop around 2015 is the same pension reporting change, not a sudden new expense.
So what? The other 78 cents depends on taxes that have not been collected yet.
The other 78 cents depends on future tax collections that haven't happened yet, primarily to cover pension obligations already locked in. The ratio ticked up between 2016 and 2023 and has drifted back down since, and the gap remains wide.

The chart above excludes physical assets like roads and buildings. What happens when we add them back in?

04

If Chicago Sold Everything, Could It Pay What It Owes? [Assets-to-Liabilities]

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Chicago's total assets divided by total liabilities, by year. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearAssets to liabilities
20031.207
20041.175
20051.128
20061.106
20071.068
20081.033
20090.990
20100.949
20110.921
20120.879
20130.853
20140.833
20150.639
20160.601
20170.604
20180.602
20190.601
20200.621
20210.637
20220.652
20230.657
20240.644
20250.638
Now add physical infrastructure back in: every road, bridge, fire station, and water main the city owns. Divide the total by what Chicago owes. Below 1.0, the city is underwater. Chicago crossed that line in 2009 and hasn't resurfaced. The steeper drop around 2015 reflects that same pension reporting change.
What this tells you Even counting every road and building at book value, the total falls short.
Even with all physical assets included at book value, the total still falls short. Some assets may be worth more in practice, but this is the standard accounting measure. The trend has moved in one direction for two decades.
Flexibility

How much room does Chicago have to adapt?
05

How Fast Is Chicago's Infrastructure Wearing Out? [Net Book Value-to-Cost of Tangible Capital Assets]

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Share of original value remaining in Chicago's tangible capital assets, by year. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearInfrastructure value remaining
200373.07%
200472.14%
200570.84%
200670.76%
200770.34%
200869.94%
200969.22%
201068.11%
201167.59%
201267.22%
201366.67%
201466.14%
201565.74%
201665.21%
201764.90%
201864.56%
201964.14%
202063.49%
202162.68%
202263.19%
202362.13%
202461.13%
202560.25%
How much useful life is left in what Chicago has built? This chart compares what the city's physical assets are worth after wear and tear (a method called depreciation) to what they originally cost. That number has fallen steadily from 73% to 60% over 22 years. Depreciation is an accounting estimate rather than a physical inspection. A steady decline over two decades still points to the city reinvesting more slowly than its assets wear out.
The catch Deferred maintenance compounds: skip a year and the repair costs more later.

Deferred maintenance compounds. Skip a year of repaving and the road degrades faster, costing more to fix later. The decline is slow enough to go unnoticed politically, until a water main bursts or a viaduct gets condemned. The backlog shows up in the specifics: at the current pace, the city’s own plan does not finish pulling out its lead service lines until 2076, about three decades past the federal deadline.

One number is missing from the city’s own reporting. The ACFR records what the city’s assets originally cost and how much of that value has been written off. The capital plan records planned spending, and says it “is not intended to be an all-inclusive inventory of the City’s capital needs.” Neither says what it would cost to restore what is already here. The city publishes the lead line inventory and the per-line price, but the $12 billion total was worked out by reporters.

06

How Much Revenue Goes Straight to Interest Payments? [Interest-to-Total Revenues]

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Interest cost as a percentage of Chicago's total revenue, by year. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearInterest to revenue
20035.23%
20045.99%
20055.38%
20065.57%
20075.51%
20085.41%
20095.78%
20105.75%
20116.29%
20126.06%
20136.11%
20147.12%
20159.63%
20165.27%
20177.47%
20185.91%
20195.73%
20205.53%
20215.55%
20224.17%
20233.78%
20243.65%
20253.40%
Of every dollar Chicago collects, how many cents go just to interest, before paying down any actual debt? At the 2015 peak, nearly 10 cents of every dollar. That spike followed the 2015 downgrade to junk, which triggered termination clauses on the interest-rate swaps tied to the city’s variable-rate bonds, forcing it to pay out or renegotiate those contracts. The city responded with a record property tax increase of $544.2 million, phased in over four years and dedicated entirely to the police and fire pension funds, plus new fees.
Look closer Cheaper debt payments, not less debt. Pension contributions are a separate cost on top.

In 2017 the city created the Sales Tax Securitization Corporation (STSC), a separate entity that borrows against Chicago’s sales tax revenue at a better rate than the city can get on its own. Refinancing through it brought interest down to about 3.4 cents per revenue dollar by 2025.

Two things to keep in mind. Refinancing replaced old debt with new debt, so Chicago still owes what it borrowed. Stretching the payments over more years makes the yearly bill smaller and the total interest larger. And this chart covers only bonds and loans. Pension contributions grew from $0.59 billion in 2016 to $2.85 billion in 2025, a separate cost on top.

Vulnerability

How dependent is Chicago on outside help?
07

How Much Money Comes from State and Federal Government? [Government Transfers-to-Total Revenue]

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
State and federal grant revenue as a percentage of Chicago's total revenue, by year. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearGovernment transfers to revenue
200319.07%
200417.59%
200516.06%
200616.13%
200714.53%
200814.02%
200914.03%
201014.73%
201117.61%
201213.23%
201313.19%
201410.01%
20159.30%
20169.07%
20178.26%
20187.96%
20197.03%
202013.01%
20218.77%
20228.63%
20238.09%
20248.76%
20257.12%
What share of Chicago's revenue comes from grants out of Springfield or Washington instead of local taxes and fees? The 2020–2021 spike is federal COVID relief: the CARES Act in 2020, then ARPA. That money has been spent, and in 2025 grant revenue fell back to about 7%, roughly where it sat in 2019, before the pandemic.
Don't count on it Programs get cut and funding gets frozen. Only local revenue is under the city's control.
State and federal priorities change. Programs get cut, funding gets paused, administrations shift direction. It already shows up in the city's audited numbers: operating grant revenue fell from $1.07 billion in 2024 to $769 million in 2025, a drop of about $300 million in one year, and that decline is what the line above is measuring. For fiscal 2026, at least 20 of the 25 largest U.S. cities reported budget gaps, driven by rising costs, lagging revenue and reduced federal support. The exposure runs wider than the city's own books, too. The CTA is a legally separate agency whose finances are not in this chart, and billions in federal money already approved for its Red Line extension and Red and Purple modernization was frozen in October 2025. A federal judge ordered it released in March 2026, on a temporary order, with the case still in litigation. A financially healthy city cannot count on outside help to close its gaps. The only revenue Chicago fully controls is local.

The money comes in.
The promises keep piling up.

Chicago doesn't have to miss a bond payment to "default" on its residents. Deferred maintenance, underfunded pensions, and rising debt are already shaping what the city can and can't do for you.

Send these charts to your alderperson (look yours up by address, or browse the full City Council list) and ask:

  • Upkeep

    What would it cost to bring what we already own back to good condition?

    Neither the audited report nor the capital plan says what it would cost to restore Chicago’s roads, pipes and buildings. The capital plan states that it “is not intended to be an all-inclusive inventory of the City’s capital needs.” For lead service lines alone, the city’s own per-line price times its own inventory comes to about $12 billion.

  • Pensions

    Will the city make the extra pension payment permanent, instead of deciding it again every year?

    Since 2023 the city has been paying more into the pension funds than state law requires, including $272 million in 2025. That is real progress on a $36.4 billion hole. It is also approved one budget at a time, so it can be trimmed or delayed.

  • Capital projects

    Will the city show what big projects cost to keep for 50 years, not just to build, starting with Lake Shore Drive?

    The plan would rebuild 22 bridges and 12 junctions on the north Drive at an estimated $3.4 billion, a construction price rather than a cost to own. After more than 1,800 residents weighed in, the agencies say no preferred alternative is final, and CMAP takes up updated plan language in October 2026.

  • Balancing the budget

    How much of next year’s budget rests on one-time money?

    FY2026 leaned on a record $1.01 billion TIF surplus, of which about $232.6 million went to the city, plus about $450 million of borrowing for operating costs. A surplus that size is set one budget at a time and has to clear the City Council, and the borrowing has to be repaid.

  • Outside money

    Which services in next year’s budget run on grants that are ending, and what will it cost to keep them?

    Grant revenue fell from $1.07 billion in 2024 to $769 million in 2025 as pandemic aid ran out, and the FY2026 budget cut 282 health department positions, which the Civic Federation says were likely in large part grant-funded. Grants are now about 7% of what the city collects.

Tell them you want a budget built on Strong Towns principles: maintain what we have, and stop passing the bill to the next generation.

Your city needs you Get involved → Discuss this project or join our Finance Committee Email us →

Hungry for more?

Twelve sources, from the raw spreadsheet to the city's own budget and hearing calendar
Source data
➔ Finance Decoder DataChicago’s Decoder worksheet, through FY2025 ➔ Chicago's ACFRsThe city's official audited financials, published yearly
The city's own numbers
➔ Chicago's Budget DocumentsThe annual budget itself: recommendations, overview, and appropriations ➔ Budget HearingsWhen the public can testify. The highest-leverage hour you can spend on this ➔ Council Office of Financial AnalysisCity Council's own independent budget analysts, since 2015 ➔ 2025–2029 Capital Improvement PlanWhere the city plans to spend on infrastructure
Independent analysis
➔ Civic Federation Pension DashboardInteractive funded ratios for all four city pension funds ➔ Civic Federation on the FY2026 BudgetHow the current budget was balanced, and what it defers
Strong Towns
➔ The Finance DecoderHow the tool works and what its seven indicators measure ➔ Strong Towns: A Bottom-Up RevolutionThe book that started the movement, by Charles Marohn
Follow the conversation
➔ A City That WorksPolicy analysis and ideas on how to make Chicago work better ➔ The Last WardChicago government accountability and City Hall decision-making

About this data

Source: Each city’s Annual Comprehensive Financial Report (ACFR), government-wide statements. Chicago’s ACFRs cover 2003–2025. Dollar figures are nominal. Six of the seven indicators are ratios, so inflation cancels out. The one real-terms comparison, for net financial position, uses annual average CPI-U: 184.0 for 2003 and 321.9 for 2025 (a partial-year average, because of the 2025 federal shutdown).

Get the data: Every indicator for all four cities, plus the population figures behind the per-resident view. Figures come from the Strong Towns Finance Decoder worksheets, one per city (Chicago’s is here). Strong Towns Chicago computed and added Chicago’s FY2025 column.

What “Chicago” covers: The City of Chicago’s reporting entity, including the Public Library and the Sales Tax Securitization Corporation. The ACFR excludes CPS, the CTA, the Park District, the Housing Authority and City Colleges as “related organizations”: the city appoints their boards but has no financial accountability for them. Full list: What’s counted, and what isn’t.

Why this differs from the ACFR’s headline: Net financial position leaves out roads, pipes and buildings, because the city cannot sell a water main to pay a pension. The ACFR’s own net position counts those assets, so it shows a smaller hole (−$30.5 billion at the end of 2025) and a smaller yearly change (−$1.27 billion, against −$1.59 billion here). Both come from the same statement. This measure asks what the city could actually pay with.

Comparing cities: Chicago, Los Angeles and Houston are close structural peers: none runs schools or a county welfare system, and each owns large utilities or airports. New York differs twice over. It runs schools and social services, which with health and CUNY are about 56% of its budget. And its figures cover governmental activities only, while the other three cover the total primary government. Recomputing Chicago on New York’s basis barely moves net debt to revenue (about 2%) but moves assets to liabilities and interest to revenue by about a third. On government transfers, the basis explains just 1.6 points of an 18.5-point gap. The rest is schools. Net debt to revenue is the most comparable measure and government transfers the least, and trends compare better than levels.

Fiscal years: They don’t line up. Chicago’s closes December 31 and the other three close June 30, so each comparison city’s FY2025 ends six months before Chicago’s. Los Angeles is charted from 2012 and Houston from 2009, the earliest years in the source data.

In 2025 dollars: The third toggle on the net financial position chart restates every year in 2025 dollars using the annual average CPI-U above. It answers whether the hole grew faster than prices, and it does. The 2003 gap of $9.4 billion is about $16.5 billion in today’s money, against $65.3 billion now.

Per resident: Available for net financial position, the only chart that isn’t already a ratio. Each year’s figure is divided by that year’s population. The 2020 populations are census counts between yearly estimates, which adds a slight step that year, and the 2024 figures are approximate; neither moves any line by more than a few percent. The 2025 populations are Census estimates for July 1, 2025: Chicago 2,731,585; New York 8,584,629; Los Angeles 3,869,089; Houston 2,397,315.

Pensions: Four funds: Municipal, Police, Fire and Laborers. The 28% funded ratio and $36.4 billion gap come from the FY2025 ACFR, measured December 31, 2025. Other published figures can differ slightly by measurement date or by whether retiree health benefits are included. The 2015 jump is GASB 68, a reporting change for obligations that already existed. These are long-term actuarial obligations, not cash due today. Per-resident figures use the population series in the data download; the per-household figure uses 1,160,205 Chicago households (Census Bureau, 2020–2024 American Community Survey five-year estimate).

Infrastructure: Depreciation is an accounting estimate, not a physical inspection. The denominator is the original cost of tangible capital assets, excluding leased and subscription assets.

Peer median: On six charts, the middle value among New York, Los Angeles and Houston each year. It describes three other large cities. It is not a target. It is left off net financial position, where dollar totals across cities of different size would mislead.

Accessibility: Every chart has a matching data table for screen readers. If the charts fail to load, the page says so and points to those tables and the download.

This page is intended to inform public discussion, not to provide financial advice. Spot an error? Let us know.

Last updated September 2026 · Reflects the FY2025 ACFR