Chicago's Fiscal
Health: Decoded
A city that can't pay its bills can't invest in its future. Strong Towns calls this the solvency principle. The charts below show how Chicago’s long-term obligations have outgrown its means, with commitments made over decades and left for the next generation to pay.
Data: 2003–2025 via Chicago Annual Comprehensive Financial Reports · City government only
The Finance Decoder & #DoTheMath
Strong Towns Chicago's #DoTheMath initiative uses the Finance Decoder to chart 23 years of city financial data. We're not prescribing specific fixes here. The goal is to give everyday Chicagoans the context to ask sharper questions of their elected officials. Every budget, project, and policy should be able to answer these three questions:
Behind all three questions is one idea, community-first accounting, which judges each decision by whether it leaves residents better off years from now. Chicago’s budget counts this year’s cash, while the bills that grow when repairs wait and pensions come up short sit in its audited report. Those bills come back as credit downgrades, property tax fights, and budget gaps closed with more borrowing.
How did we get here?
Strong Towns founder Charles Marohn argues that cities go broke for one core reason. They build things that cost more to maintain than they'll ever produce in revenue. Chicago is no exception. Here's how the pattern plays out, and what Strong Towns says the alternative looks like:
The Numbers at a Glance
Four numbers every Chicago resident should know, pulled directly from the city's 2025 Annual Comprehensive Financial Report (ACFR), released in June 2026. They cover the city government only, which is about a quarter of your property tax bill.
What these numbers cover
The City of Chicago is roughly a quarter of your property tax bill. The Chicago Board of Education alone is more than half.
Counted: police, fire, streets, water, sewer, the airports, the Public Library and the Sales Tax Securitization Corporation.
Not counted: CPS, the CTA, the Park District, the Housing Authority, City Colleges and the Public Building Commission, which the ACFR calls related organizations because the city appoints their boards but has no financial accountability for them. Cook County, the Forest Preserve District and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District have no connection to the city at all. They are separate governments that tax your property on their own.
All of them carry their own debts and pension gaps, and all of them bill the same households. Every figure on this page understates what Chicago residents owe in total.
What changed in the FY2025 numbers
- The city took in $15.0 billion in 2025 and ran up $16.2 billion in costs, a shortfall of $1.27 billion on its audited bottom line. On the measure charted here, which counts only financial assets, the hole deepened by $1.6 billion to $65.3 billion.
- The pension funds now hold 28 cents for every dollar promised, up from 25 cents. The city paid in $2.85 billion, about twice what the funds earned on investments. The dollar gap barely moved, from $36.5 billion to $36.4 billion.
- Interest on all city debt fell to 7.7 cents of every dollar it collects, the lowest in the 23 years shown. Since 2021 the interest bill has fallen about 16% while revenue has grown about 16%.
- Grant revenue fell to 7% of what the city takes in. The city attributes the drop to lower reimbursable grant activity and to the timing of grantor reimbursements and reviews.
- Everything the city owns, from buildings and roads to pipes and land, has 59% of its original cost left on the books, down from 73% in 2003. Roads, bridges and other governmental infrastructure on their own are down to 40%.
Sustainability
Can Chicago keep this up long-term?
The Bottom Line: How Deep in the Hole Is Chicago? [Net Financial Position]
Cash and financial assets (excluding roads, buildings, etc.) minus total liabilities
New York’s figures include its schools and welfare, so they cover far more than the other three cities.
Inflation did most of this work. Prices rose 34% between 2016 and 2025 while the gap grew from $58.5 billion to $65.3 billion, so the real burden shrank faster than the city added to it. That effect has nearly run out. The real gap improved by less than $100 million in 2025.
| Year | Net financial position | Per resident | ACFR net position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | −$9.44 billion | −$3,291 per resident | $3.55 billion |
| 2004 | −$10.53 billion | −$3,709 per resident | $3.13 billion |
| 2005 | −$11.39 billion | −$4,054 per resident | $2.71 billion |
| 2006 | −$13.01 billion | −$4,685 per resident | $2.35 billion |
| 2007 | −$14.76 billion | −$5,374 per resident | $1.60 billion |
| 2008 | −$16.59 billion | −$6,098 per resident | $0.83 billion |
| 2009 | −$18.68 billion | −$6,909 per resident | −$0.29 billion |
| 2010 | −$20.49 billion | −$7,601 per resident | −$1.57 billion |
| 2011 | −$22.48 billion | −$8,301 per resident | −$2.61 billion |
| 2012 | −$25.44 billion | −$9,356 per resident | −$4.28 billion |
| 2013 | −$27.12 billion | −$9,950 per resident | −$5.37 billion |
| 2014 | −$29.24 billion | −$10,732 per resident | −$6.54 billion |
| 2015 | −$55.84 billion | −$20,548 per resident | −$23.83 billion |
| 2016 | −$58.46 billion | −$21,612 per resident | −$27.43 billion |
| 2017 | −$58.84 billion | −$21,814 per resident | −$28.37 billion |
| 2018 | −$59.67 billion | −$22,211 per resident | −$29.36 billion |
| 2019 | −$59.53 billion | −$22,232 per resident | −$29.46 billion |
| 2020 | −$60.54 billion | −$22,043 per resident | −$28.42 billion |
| 2021 | −$59.72 billion | −$22,147 per resident | −$27.12 billion |
| 2022 | −$62.01 billion | −$23,268 per resident | −$27.63 billion |
| 2023 | −$62.96 billion | −$23,630 per resident | −$28.21 billion |
| 2024 | −$63.69 billion | −$23,498 per resident | −$29.25 billion |
| 2025 | −$65.28 billion | −$23,898 per resident | −$30.52 billion |
What this chart shows: Everything Chicago has in the bank, minus everything it owes in pensions, bonds, and other debts. The result is negative $65.3 billion, and it got worse by roughly $1.6 billion in 2025 alone.
The dashed line is the city’s official ACFR net position, which also counts buildings, roads and pipes. It shows a smaller hole, negative $30.5 billion, and it was positive until 2009.
The cliff in 2015 comes from an accounting change rather than new borrowing. A rule called GASB 68 put the full size of the city’s pension promises on the balance sheet for the first time.
The 2015 cliff
In 2015 the reported hole grew $26.6 billion in one year. No other year in this series moved by more than $3 billion. Chicago did not borrow that money. GASB 68 began requiring cities to carry the full size of their pension promises as a liability, and decades of accumulated debt arrived on the balance sheet at once. For the twelve years before that it sat in the footnotes, so the city’s audited bottom line understated what it owed by more than a full year of city revenue. An obligation that never reaches the balance sheet is one no budget has to answer for.
No such rule exists for the roads, pipes and buildings the city already owns. They wear out the way a pension promise accrues, quietly and without a bill, and neither the audited report nor the capital plan says what restoring them would cost. Strong Towns argues that this is the infrastructure problem most cities actually have.
The two halves of this chart are measured differently, so the early years should not be read straight across to the recent ones. On the old rules the hole roughly tripled from 2003 to 2014. On the new rules it has widened in every year but two.
Deals still on the books
Between 2005 and 2009 Chicago leased the Skyway, downtown garages and parking meters to private operators for 75 to 99 years, in exchange for about $3.5 billion up front. Most of that cash is long gone, about half of it spent on day-to-day operating costs. The city’s audited books spread each payment over its lease, and the $2.8 billion covering years still to come counts in this chart alongside the city’s debts.
What this means for you
How deep is the debt? Three more ways to measure it 3 charts
How Many Years Would It Take to Pay Off the Debt? [Net Debt-to-Total Revenues]
New York’s figures include its schools and welfare, so they cover far more than the other three cities.
| Year | Net debt to revenue |
|---|---|
| 2003 | 1.64× annual revenue |
| 2004 | 1.79× annual revenue |
| 2005 | 1.83× annual revenue |
| 2006 | 1.95× annual revenue |
| 2007 | 2.11× annual revenue |
| 2008 | 2.35× annual revenue |
| 2009 | 2.79× annual revenue |
| 2010 | 2.91× annual revenue |
| 2011 | 2.98× annual revenue |
| 2012 | 3.35× annual revenue |
| 2013 | 3.47× annual revenue |
| 2014 | 3.59× annual revenue |
| 2015 | 6.24× annual revenue |
| 2016 | 6.21× annual revenue |
| 2017 | 6.09× annual revenue |
| 2018 | 5.77× annual revenue |
| 2019 | 5.29× annual revenue |
| 2020 | 5.40× annual revenue |
| 2021 | 4.63× annual revenue |
| 2022 | 4.83× annual revenue |
| 2023 | 4.19× annual revenue |
| 2024 | 4.37× annual revenue |
| 2025 | 4.36× annual revenue |
Read the fine print
Could the City Cover Its Bills Tomorrow? [Financial Assets-to-Total Liabilities]
New York’s figures include its schools and welfare, so they cover far more than the other three cities.
| Year | Financial assets to liabilities |
|---|---|
| 2003 | 0.448 |
| 2004 | 0.413 |
| 2005 | 0.464 |
| 2006 | 0.412 |
| 2007 | 0.377 |
| 2008 | 0.337 |
| 2009 | 0.322 |
| 2010 | 0.329 |
| 2011 | 0.321 |
| 2012 | 0.279 |
| 2013 | 0.260 |
| 2014 | 0.255 |
| 2015 | 0.153 |
| 2016 | 0.149 |
| 2017 | 0.178 |
| 2018 | 0.192 |
| 2019 | 0.194 |
| 2020 | 0.192 |
| 2021 | 0.201 |
| 2022 | 0.219 |
| 2023 | 0.234 |
| 2024 | 0.224 |
| 2025 | 0.225 |
So what?
The chart above excludes physical assets like roads and buildings. What happens when we add them back in?
If Chicago Sold Everything, Could It Pay What It Owes? [Assets-to-Liabilities]
New York’s figures include its schools and welfare, so they cover far more than the other three cities.
| Year | Assets to liabilities |
|---|---|
| 2003 | 1.207 |
| 2004 | 1.175 |
| 2005 | 1.128 |
| 2006 | 1.106 |
| 2007 | 1.068 |
| 2008 | 1.033 |
| 2009 | 0.990 |
| 2010 | 0.949 |
| 2011 | 0.921 |
| 2012 | 0.879 |
| 2013 | 0.853 |
| 2014 | 0.833 |
| 2015 | 0.639 |
| 2016 | 0.601 |
| 2017 | 0.604 |
| 2018 | 0.602 |
| 2019 | 0.601 |
| 2020 | 0.621 |
| 2021 | 0.637 |
| 2022 | 0.652 |
| 2023 | 0.657 |
| 2024 | 0.644 |
| 2025 | 0.638 |
What this tells you
Flexibility
How much room does Chicago have to adapt?
How Fast Is Chicago's Infrastructure Wearing Out? [Net Book Value-to-Cost of Tangible Capital Assets]
New York’s figures include its schools and welfare, so they cover far more than the other three cities.
Not fully matched from 2022. Chicago’s figure counts leased and subscription assets on both sides of the ratio, as the Strong Towns worksheet intends. The comparison cities’ figures from 2022 on may count them only in the net value, which for Chicago overstated the result by about a point.
| Year | Infrastructure value remaining |
|---|---|
| 2003 | 73.07% |
| 2004 | 72.14% |
| 2005 | 70.84% |
| 2006 | 70.76% |
| 2007 | 70.34% |
| 2008 | 69.94% |
| 2009 | 69.22% |
| 2010 | 68.11% |
| 2011 | 67.59% |
| 2012 | 67.22% |
| 2013 | 66.67% |
| 2014 | 66.14% |
| 2015 | 65.74% |
| 2016 | 65.21% |
| 2017 | 64.90% |
| 2018 | 64.56% |
| 2019 | 64.14% |
| 2020 | 63.49% |
| 2021 | 62.68% |
| 2022 | 62.11% |
| 2023 | 61.06% |
| 2024 | 60.04% |
| 2025 | 59.28% |
The catch
Deferred maintenance compounds. Skip a year of repaving and the road degrades faster, costing more to fix later. The decline is slow enough to go unnoticed politically, until a water main bursts or a viaduct gets condemned. The backlog shows up in the specifics. At the current pace, the city’s own plan does not finish pulling out its lead service lines until 2076, about three decades past the federal deadline.
One number is missing from the city’s own reporting. The ACFR records what the city’s assets originally cost and how much of that value has been written off. The capital plan records planned spending, and says it “is not intended to be an all-inclusive inventory of the City’s capital needs.” Neither says what it would cost to restore what is already here. The city publishes the lead line inventory and the per-line price, but the $12 billion total was worked out by reporters.
How Much Revenue Goes Straight to Interest Payments? [Interest-to-Total Revenues]
Comparison cities are not shown on this chart. Each reports a different mix of water, sewer, airport and other enterprise debt, so their interest figures cannot be matched to Chicago’s. Their figures are in the data download.
| Year | Interest to revenue |
|---|---|
| 2003 | 10.32% |
| 2004 | 11.42% |
| 2005 | 10.46% |
| 2006 | 10.49% |
| 2007 | 10.49% |
| 2008 | 10.82% |
| 2009 | 11.70% |
| 2010 | 11.79% |
| 2011 | 12.50% |
| 2012 | 12.09% |
| 2013 | 12.38% |
| 2014 | 13.66% |
| 2015 | 16.00% |
| 2016 | 11.27% |
| 2017 | 13.30% |
| 2018 | 11.08% |
| 2019 | 10.66% |
| 2020 | 10.48% |
| 2021 | 10.61% |
| 2022 | 9.34% |
| 2023 | 8.52% |
| 2024 | 8.50% |
| 2025 | 7.67% |
Look closer
In 2017 the city created the Sales Tax Securitization Corporation (STSC), a separate entity that borrows against Chicago’s sales tax revenue at a better rate than the city can get on its own. Refinancing through it lowered the city’s borrowing costs. Interest is now about 7.7 cents per revenue dollar, the lowest in this series. Most of that decline came after 2021, when the interest bill fell from about $1.37 billion to $1.15 billion while revenue grew by a similar proportion. The two did roughly equal work.
Two things to keep in mind. Refinancing replaced old debt with new debt, so Chicago still owes what it borrowed. Stretching the payments over more years makes the yearly bill smaller and the total interest larger. And this chart covers only bonds and loans. Pension contributions grew from $0.59 billion in 2016 to $2.85 billion in 2025, a separate cost on top.
Vulnerability
How dependent is Chicago on outside help?
How Much of the City’s Revenue Comes from Grants? [Government Transfers-to-Total Revenue]
New York sits high for a reason. It runs the schools and welfare, which bring large amounts of state and federal money with them. Chicago, LA and Houston run neither.
| Year | Government transfers to revenue | Including money not tied to a program |
|---|---|---|
| 2003 | 19.07% | 27.72% |
| 2004 | 17.59% | 26.49% |
| 2005 | 16.06% | 25.80% |
| 2006 | 16.13% | 25.94% |
| 2007 | 14.53% | 24.74% |
| 2008 | 14.02% | 24.13% |
| 2009 | 14.03% | 23.03% |
| 2010 | 14.73% | 24.83% |
| 2011 | 17.61% | 25.54% |
| 2012 | 13.23% | 22.35% |
| 2013 | 13.19% | 22.83% |
| 2014 | 10.01% | 19.10% |
| 2015 | 9.30% | 18.41% |
| 2016 | 9.07% | 17.39% |
| 2017 | 8.26% | 16.14% |
| 2018 | 7.96% | 15.58% |
| 2019 | 7.03% | 14.89% |
| 2020 | 13.01% | 20.77% |
| 2021 | 8.77% | 24.15% |
| 2022 | 8.63% | 23.07% |
| 2023 | 8.09% | 17.20% |
| 2024 | 8.76% | 17.25% |
| 2025 | 7.12% | 15.36% |
Why the line fell
Nobody had to cut grants for this line to fall. Chicago’s own revenue has more than doubled since 2003 while that money has not kept up, so it covers a smaller piece of a bigger budget every year.
The steepest drop came between 2011 and 2015, when water and sewer rates roughly doubled, with the record property tax increase and the garbage fee close behind.
That cuts both ways. Chicago is less exposed to a federal or state cut than it was in 2003, which is real protection, though residents paid for it through higher local bills.
Don't count on it
The money comes in.
The promises keep piling up.
Chicago doesn't have to miss a bond payment to "default" on its residents. Deferred maintenance, underfunded pensions, and rising debt are already shaping what the city can and can't do for you.
Send these charts to your alderperson (look yours up by address, or browse the full City Council list) and ask:
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Upkeep
What would it cost to bring what we already own back to good condition?
The city does not publish what it would cost to fix the roads, pipes and buildings it already owns. Its own capital plan says it “is not intended to be an all-inclusive inventory of the City’s capital needs.” Lead pipes alone would run about $12 billion.
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Pensions
Will the extra pension payment be written into city ordinance instead of decided again every year?
Since 2023 the city has been paying more into the pension funds than state law requires, including $272 million in 2025. That is real progress on a $36.4 billion hole. It is also approved one budget at a time, so it can be trimmed or delayed.
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Capital projects
Will you ask what big projects cost to maintain after they are built, starting with Lake Shore Drive?
Rebuilding the north stretch would cost an estimated $3.4 billion to build. Nobody has said what it will cost to maintain and eventually replace, which is the bill that arrives long after the ribbon cutting. No design is final yet.
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Balancing the budget
How much of next year’s budget rests on one-time money?
The 2026 budget covered ongoing costs with about $233 million pulled from TIF districts, money normally reserved for development projects, plus about $450 million of borrowing. Both are one-time sources, so the same gap has to be filled again next year.
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Outside money
Which services in next year’s budget run on grants that are ending?
The 2026 budget cut 282 health department positions, which the Civic Federation says were likely in large part grant-funded. Grant money has fallen from about 9% of what the city collects to about 7%.
Tell them you want a budget built on Strong Towns principles. Maintain what we have, and stop passing the bill to the next generation.
Get the next update
We refresh this page every summer when the city publishes its audited financials, and announce each update in the Strong Towns Chicago newsletter.
Hungry for more?
About this data
Source: Each city’s Annual Comprehensive Financial Report (ACFR), government-wide statements. Chicago’s ACFRs cover 2003–2025. Dollar figures are nominal. Six of the seven indicators are ratios, so inflation cancels out. The one real-terms comparison, for net financial position, uses annual average CPI-U: 184.0 for 2003 and 321.9 for 2025 (a partial-year average, because of the 2025 federal shutdown).
Get the data: Every indicator for all four cities, plus the population figures behind the per-resident view. Figures come from the Strong Towns Finance Decoder worksheets, one per city (Chicago’s is here). Strong Towns Chicago computed and added Chicago’s FY2025 column.
What “Chicago” covers: The City of Chicago’s reporting entity, including the Public Library and the Sales Tax Securitization Corporation. The ACFR excludes CPS, the CTA, the Park District, the Housing Authority and City Colleges as “related organizations”, meaning the city appoints their boards but has no financial accountability for them. Full list: What these numbers cover.
Why this differs from the ACFR’s headline: Net financial position leaves out roads, pipes and buildings, because the city cannot sell a water main to pay a pension. The ACFR’s own net position counts those assets, so it shows a smaller hole (−$30.5 billion at the end of 2025) and a smaller yearly change (−$1.27 billion, against −$1.59 billion here). The $322 million difference in the yearly change is the $762 million the city added in capital assets during 2025, which this measure does not count as an improvement, less the $440 million decline in deferred outflows, which it does not count as a loss. Both figures come from the same statement. This measure asks what the city could actually pay with.
Comparing cities: Chicago, Los Angeles and Houston are close structural peers. None runs schools or a county welfare system, and each owns large utilities or airports. New York differs twice over. It runs schools and social services, which with health and CUNY are about 56% of its budget. And its figures cover governmental activities only, while the other three cover the total primary government. Recomputing Chicago on New York’s basis barely moves net debt to revenue (about 2%) but moves assets to liabilities by about a third. Interest to revenue is not comparable at all, because Chicago’s figure counts enterprise interest and the others do not. On government transfers, the basis explains just 1.6 points of an 18.5-point gap. The rest is schools. Net debt to revenue is the most comparable measure and government transfers the least, and trends compare better than levels.
Fiscal years: They don’t line up. Chicago’s closes December 31 and the other three close June 30, so each comparison city’s FY2025 ends six months before Chicago’s. Los Angeles is charted from 2012 and Houston from 2009, the earliest years in the source data.
In 2025 dollars: The third toggle on the net financial position chart restates every year in 2025 dollars using the annual average CPI-U above. It answers whether the hole grew faster than prices, and it does. The 2003 gap of $9.4 billion is about $16.5 billion in today’s money, against $65.3 billion now.
Per resident: Available for net financial position, the only chart that isn’t already a ratio. Each year’s figure is divided by that year’s population. The 2020 populations are census counts between yearly estimates, which adds a slight step that year, and the 2024 figures are approximate; neither moves any line by more than a few percent. The 2025 populations are Census estimates for July 1, 2025: Chicago 2,731,585; New York 8,584,629; Los Angeles 3,869,089; Houston 2,397,315.
Pensions: Four funds: Municipal, Police, Fire and Laborers. The 28% funded ratio and $36.4 billion gap come from the FY2025 ACFR, measured December 31, 2025. Other published figures can differ slightly by measurement date or by whether retiree health benefits are included. The 2015 jump is GASB 68, a reporting change for obligations that already existed. These obligations come due over decades. Per-resident figures use the population series in the data download; the per-household figure uses 1,160,205 Chicago households (Census Bureau, 2020–2024 American Community Survey five-year estimate).
Infrastructure: Depreciation is an accounting estimate rather than a physical inspection. The denominator is the original cost of all capital assets. Leases and software subscriptions were first recorded as capital assets in 2022 and 2023, under GASB 87 and GASB 96, and are counted from those years onward. They sit at about 40% of original cost because they amortize over the lease term rather than the asset’s useful life, which lowers the measure by roughly half a point from 2022. Earlier years contain no such assets. The figure covers everything the city owns, including land and construction in progress; governmental infrastructure alone, meaning roads and bridges, stands at about 40%.
Peer median: On six charts, the middle value among New York, Los Angeles and Houston each year. It describes three other large cities. It is not a target. It is left off net financial position, where dollar totals across cities of different size would mislead.
Accessibility: Every chart has a matching data table for screen readers. If the charts fail to load, the page says so and points to those tables and the download.
This page informs public discussion and does not provide financial advice. Spot an error? Let us know.
Last updated September 2026 · Reflects the FY2025 ACFR