Finance Decoder Report

Chicago's Fiscal
Health: Decoded

A city that can't pay its bills can't invest in its future. Strong Towns calls this the solvency principle. The charts below show how Chicago’s long-term obligations have outgrown its means, with commitments made over decades and left for the next generation to pay.

Data: 2003–2025 via Chicago Annual Comprehensive Financial Reports · City government only

The Finance Decoder & #DoTheMath

Strong Towns Chicago's #DoTheMath initiative uses the Finance Decoder to chart 23 years of city financial data. We're not prescribing specific fixes here. The goal is to give everyday Chicagoans the context to ask sharper questions of their elected officials. Every budget, project, and policy should be able to answer these three questions:

01
Sustainability
"Can Chicago keep providing the services it provides today a generation from now?"
02
Flexibility
"If something unexpected hits (a recession, a disaster, a spike in costs), does Chicago have room in the budget to respond?"
03
Vulnerability
"How much of Chicago's budget depends on money from the state or federal government?"

Behind all three questions is one idea, community-first accounting, which judges each decision by whether it leaves residents better off years from now. Chicago’s budget counts this year’s cash, while the bills that grow when repairs wait and pensions come up short sit in its audited report. Those bills come back as credit downgrades, property tax fights, and budget gaps closed with more borrowing.

How did we get here?

Strong Towns founder Charles Marohn argues that cities go broke for one core reason. They build things that cost more to maintain than they'll ever produce in revenue. Chicago is no exception. Here's how the pattern plays out, and what Strong Towns says the alternative looks like:

Cities build more than they can maintain900,000 fewer residents, the same 9,000-plus miles of pipe

After World War II, American cities spread out with wide roads, parking lots, and low-density development, what Strong Towns calls “The Suburban Experiment.” That growth pays off right away. Maintaining it costs more than it ever returns, and that bill arrives years later, so the usual answer is more new development to chase the next round of revenue.

Chicago ran a version of this on itself. Its population peaked at 3.6 million in 1950. It cleared neighborhoods for expressways and rewrote its zoning to keep new density out. Growth went to the suburbs instead, cutting Chicago from about two-thirds of the region’s residents to under a third. The pipes did not leave with them. About 900,000 fewer people now maintain the same 9,000-plus miles of water and sewer mains.

That left streets, water pipes, sewers, and streetlights deteriorating for decades. New projects come with a groundbreaking and a ribbon cutting. A repaving schedule comes with neither, which makes upkeep the easiest thing to postpone.

Short-term fixes create long-term problemsThe FY2026 budget leans on about $450 million of borrowing for operating costs

When money got tight, leaders turned to quick patches. They leased out public assets like the Skyway and the parking meters for decades in exchange for cash up front, borrowed to cover today's bills, and pushed costs into the future. Each "fix" created bigger problems down the road.

Those leases are nearly two decades old, and the habit continues. The FY2026 budget authorized roughly $1.8 billion in new borrowing, including about $450 million to cover operating costs, along with debt issued for police misconduct settlements and firefighter back pay.

Economists call this temporal discounting. Tomorrow's problem always feels less urgent than today's.

Pensions followed the same pattern, at massive scale28 cents on hand for every dollar promised to retirees

For decades, state law set Chicago’s pension contributions with a formula tied to what employees paid in rather than what the benefits would cost. The city paid what the formula asked for, year after year, and it was never enough to keep up with the promises being made. That shortfall compounded into roughly $36.4 billion in unfunded pension liabilities, the largest item on the city’s balance sheet, and catching up now competes with services in every budget.

That formula is gone. Payments are now set by an actuarial calculation, and they run nearly five times what they did in 2016. Where that leaves the funds comes down to two numbers, and they get mixed up constantly.

  • The annual billWhat the city pays each year against the full actuarial cost. Chicago covered 27% in 2016 and 85% in 2025. The missing share is partly deliberate, since the law aims for 90% funding rather than paying the debt off in full.
  • The funded ratioWhat the funds hold against everything already promised. That is 28%, the accumulated result of the old formula.

The city has also been paying more than state law requires, nearly $1.1 billion since 2023. The $272 million of that which landed in 2025 is counted in the 85% above, and without it the share would be about 77%. Real progress, approved one budget at a time.

The alternative

The Strong Towns approach is simple in principle, even if politically difficult:

  • Maintain what you already have
  • Grow gradually, not all at once
  • Invest in things that pay for themselves

The Numbers at a Glance

Four numbers every Chicago resident should know, pulled directly from the city's 2025 Annual Comprehensive Financial Report (ACFR), released in June 2026. They cover the city government only, which is about a quarter of your property tax bill.

−$65.3B
Net financial position
Chicago owes $65.3 billion more than it has in cash and other financial assets. In 2003 the gap was $9.4 billion, about $16.5 billion in today's money.
28%
Pension funded ratio
Across its four pension funds, Chicago has 28 cents for every dollar promised to retirees. The $36.4 billion gap works out to about $13,300 per resident, or $31,400 per household.
$2.85B
Annual pension contribution
Up from $0.59 billion in 2016, a nearly fivefold increase in nine years. That's roughly one in every five dollars of city revenue, before a single service is delivered.
60%
Infrastructure value remaining
60% of the original value of Chicago's roads, pipes, and buildings is left on the books, down from 73% in 2003. No city document says what restoring them would cost.

What these numbers cover

City government only. Schools, transit, parks and the county are not included.

The City of Chicago is roughly a quarter of your property tax bill. The Chicago Board of Education alone is more than half.

Counted: police, fire, streets, water, sewer, the airports, the Public Library and the Sales Tax Securitization Corporation.

Not counted: CPS, the CTA, the Park District, the Housing Authority, City Colleges and the Public Building Commission, which the ACFR calls related organizations because the city appoints their boards but has no financial accountability for them. Cook County, the Forest Preserve District and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District have no connection to the city at all. They are separate governments that tax your property on their own.

All of them carry their own debts and pension gaps, and all of them bill the same households. Every figure on this page understates what Chicago residents owe in total.

What changed in the FY2025 numbers

The hole deepened by $1.6 billion, and pension funding improved on the city’s own payments
  • The city took in $15.0 billion in 2025 and ran up $16.2 billion in costs, a shortfall of $1.27 billion on its audited bottom line. On the measure charted here, which counts only financial assets, the hole deepened by $1.6 billion to $65.3 billion.
  • The pension funds now hold 28 cents for every dollar promised, up from 25 cents. The city paid in $2.85 billion, about twice what the funds earned on investments. The dollar gap barely moved, from $36.5 billion to $36.4 billion.
  • Interest on all city debt fell to 7.7 cents of every dollar it collects, the lowest in the 23 years shown. Since 2021 the interest bill has fallen about 16% while revenue has grown about 16%.
  • Grant revenue fell to 7% of what the city takes in. The city attributes the drop to lower reimbursable grant activity and to the timing of grantor reimbursements and reviews.
  • Everything the city owns, from buildings and roads to pipes and land, has 59% of its original cost left on the books, down from 73% in 2003. Roads, bridges and other governmental infrastructure on their own are down to 40%.
Sustainability

Can Chicago keep this up long-term?

01

The Bottom Line: How Deep in the Hole Is Chicago? [Net Financial Position]

Cash and financial assets (excluding roads, buildings, etc.) minus total liabilities

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Chicago's net financial position by year, in billions of dollars, shown as a total, per resident, and beside the official ACFR net position. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearNet financial positionPer residentACFR net position
2003−$9.44 billion−$3,291 per resident$3.55 billion
2004−$10.53 billion−$3,709 per resident$3.13 billion
2005−$11.39 billion−$4,054 per resident$2.71 billion
2006−$13.01 billion−$4,685 per resident$2.35 billion
2007−$14.76 billion−$5,374 per resident$1.60 billion
2008−$16.59 billion−$6,098 per resident$0.83 billion
2009−$18.68 billion−$6,909 per resident−$0.29 billion
2010−$20.49 billion−$7,601 per resident−$1.57 billion
2011−$22.48 billion−$8,301 per resident−$2.61 billion
2012−$25.44 billion−$9,356 per resident−$4.28 billion
2013−$27.12 billion−$9,950 per resident−$5.37 billion
2014−$29.24 billion−$10,732 per resident−$6.54 billion
2015−$55.84 billion−$20,548 per resident−$23.83 billion
2016−$58.46 billion−$21,612 per resident−$27.43 billion
2017−$58.84 billion−$21,814 per resident−$28.37 billion
2018−$59.67 billion−$22,211 per resident−$29.36 billion
2019−$59.53 billion−$22,232 per resident−$29.46 billion
2020−$60.54 billion−$22,043 per resident−$28.42 billion
2021−$59.72 billion−$22,147 per resident−$27.12 billion
2022−$62.01 billion−$23,268 per resident−$27.63 billion
2023−$62.96 billion−$23,630 per resident−$28.21 billion
2024−$63.69 billion−$23,498 per resident−$29.25 billion
2025−$65.28 billion−$23,898 per resident−$30.52 billion

What this chart shows: Everything Chicago has in the bank, minus everything it owes in pensions, bonds, and other debts. The result is negative $65.3 billion, and it got worse by roughly $1.6 billion in 2025 alone.

The dashed line is the city’s official ACFR net position, which also counts buildings, roads and pipes. It shows a smaller hole, negative $30.5 billion, and it was positive until 2009.

The cliff in 2015 comes from an accounting change rather than new borrowing. A rule called GASB 68 put the full size of the city’s pension promises on the balance sheet for the first time.

The 2015 cliff $26.6 billion appeared in one year, and the debt was already there.

In 2015 the reported hole grew $26.6 billion in one year. No other year in this series moved by more than $3 billion. Chicago did not borrow that money. GASB 68 began requiring cities to carry the full size of their pension promises as a liability, and decades of accumulated debt arrived on the balance sheet at once. For the twelve years before that it sat in the footnotes, so the city’s audited bottom line understated what it owed by more than a full year of city revenue. An obligation that never reaches the balance sheet is one no budget has to answer for.

No such rule exists for the roads, pipes and buildings the city already owns. They wear out the way a pension promise accrues, quietly and without a bill, and neither the audited report nor the capital plan says what restoring them would cost. Strong Towns argues that this is the infrastructure problem most cities actually have.

The two halves of this chart are measured differently, so the early years should not be read straight across to the recent ones. On the old rules the hole roughly tripled from 2003 to 2014. On the new rules it has widened in every year but two.

Deals still on the books The Skyway, garage and parking meter deals still add $2.8 billion to the gap.

Between 2005 and 2009 Chicago leased the Skyway, downtown garages and parking meters to private operators for 75 to 99 years, in exchange for about $3.5 billion up front. Most of that cash is long gone, about half of it spent on day-to-day operating costs. The city’s audited books spread each payment over its lease, and the $2.8 billion covering years still to come counts in this chart alongside the city’s debts.

What this means for you Closing this gap means higher taxes, lower spending, or reduced benefits. Refinancing only moves it.
That $65.3 billion gap will eventually be addressed through some combination of higher taxes, lower spending, or reduced benefits. Refinancing stretches payments out, but doesn't reduce the total owed. To meaningfully close this gap, the city would need to take in more than it spends, consistently, for many years. In 2025 the city took in $15.0 billion and booked $16.2 billion in costs, so the gap widened again. Switch the chart to per resident to compare cities of different size. Chicago's gap works out to about $23,900 per resident, against $34,200 in New York, $9,400 in Los Angeles and $5,800 in Houston.

How deep is the debt? Three more ways to measure it 3 charts

02

How Many Years Would It Take to Pay Off the Debt? [Net Debt-to-Total Revenues]

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Chicago's net debt as a multiple of annual revenue, by year. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearNet debt to revenue
20031.64× annual revenue
20041.79× annual revenue
20051.83× annual revenue
20061.95× annual revenue
20072.11× annual revenue
20082.35× annual revenue
20092.79× annual revenue
20102.91× annual revenue
20112.98× annual revenue
20123.35× annual revenue
20133.47× annual revenue
20143.59× annual revenue
20156.24× annual revenue
20166.21× annual revenue
20176.09× annual revenue
20185.77× annual revenue
20195.29× annual revenue
20205.40× annual revenue
20214.63× annual revenue
20224.83× annual revenue
20234.19× annual revenue
20244.37× annual revenue
20254.36× annual revenue
Think of it this way: If Chicago devoted every dollar of revenue to paying off debt and spent nothing else, it would take 4.4 years. The jump in 2015 comes from the same pension reporting change described above. At that peak it would have taken over 6 years. This counts everything the city owes, including pensions. The $36.4 billion pension gap is the largest single piece, which is why the figure runs well above what Chicago owes on its bonds.
Read the fine print The ratio improved because revenue grew. What the city owes kept rising.
The ratio improved from 6.2x in 2015 to 4.4x by 2025 almost entirely on revenue growth, including a temporary boost from pandemic-era federal aid. Over those same years what Chicago owes, after subtracting what it holds, rose from $55.8 billion to $65.3 billion. The 2025 reading is essentially flat against 2024, and in 2003 this ratio was under 2x.
03

Could the City Cover Its Bills Tomorrow? [Financial Assets-to-Total Liabilities]

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Chicago's financial assets divided by total liabilities, by year. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearFinancial assets to liabilities
20030.448
20040.413
20050.464
20060.412
20070.377
20080.337
20090.322
20100.329
20110.321
20120.279
20130.260
20140.255
20150.153
20160.149
20170.178
20180.192
20190.194
20200.192
20210.201
20220.219
20230.234
20240.224
20250.225
Set aside physical infrastructure for a moment. Count only what Chicago has in cash, investments, and receivables, then compare that to everything it owes. The city can cover about 22 cents of every dollar of its obligations with its financial assets. Some of that is cash, and some is money owed to the city or already committed to a specific purpose. The drop around 2015 comes from the same pension reporting change.
So what? Nothing is set aside against the other 78 cents.
Nothing is set aside against the other 78 cents today. Most of it is pension and retiree health obligations that future revenue will have to cover. Some is debt on the water, sewer and airport systems, which is repaid from those fees rather than from taxes. The ratio ticked up between 2016 and 2023 and has drifted back down since, and the gap remains wide.

The chart above excludes physical assets like roads and buildings. What happens when we add them back in?

04

If Chicago Sold Everything, Could It Pay What It Owes? [Assets-to-Liabilities]

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Chicago's total assets divided by total liabilities, by year. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearAssets to liabilities
20031.207
20041.175
20051.128
20061.106
20071.068
20081.033
20090.990
20100.949
20110.921
20120.879
20130.853
20140.833
20150.639
20160.601
20170.604
20180.602
20190.601
20200.621
20210.637
20220.652
20230.657
20240.644
20250.638
Now add physical infrastructure back in. That means every road, bridge, fire station, and water main the city owns. Divide the total by what Chicago owes. Below 1.0, the city is underwater. Chicago crossed that line in 2009 and hasn't resurfaced. The steeper drop around 2015 reflects that same pension reporting change.
What this tells you Even counting every road and building at book value, the total falls short.
Even with all physical assets included at book value, the total still falls short. Some assets may be worth more in practice, but this is the standard accounting measure. The trend has moved in one direction for two decades.
Flexibility

How much room does Chicago have to adapt?

05

How Fast Is Chicago's Infrastructure Wearing Out? [Net Book Value-to-Cost of Tangible Capital Assets]

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Share of original value remaining in Chicago's tangible capital assets, by year. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearInfrastructure value remaining
200373.07%
200472.14%
200570.84%
200670.76%
200770.34%
200869.94%
200969.22%
201068.11%
201167.59%
201267.22%
201366.67%
201466.14%
201565.74%
201665.21%
201764.90%
201864.56%
201964.14%
202063.49%
202162.68%
202262.11%
202361.06%
202460.04%
202559.28%
How much useful life is left in what Chicago has built? This chart compares what the city's physical assets are worth after wear and tear (a method called depreciation) to what they originally cost. That number has fallen steadily from 73% to 59% over 23 years. Depreciation is an accounting estimate rather than a physical inspection. A steady decline over two decades still points to the city reinvesting more slowly than its assets wear out.
The catch Deferred maintenance compounds. Skip a year and the repair costs more later.

Deferred maintenance compounds. Skip a year of repaving and the road degrades faster, costing more to fix later. The decline is slow enough to go unnoticed politically, until a water main bursts or a viaduct gets condemned. The backlog shows up in the specifics. At the current pace, the city’s own plan does not finish pulling out its lead service lines until 2076, about three decades past the federal deadline.

One number is missing from the city’s own reporting. The ACFR records what the city’s assets originally cost and how much of that value has been written off. The capital plan records planned spending, and says it “is not intended to be an all-inclusive inventory of the City’s capital needs.” Neither says what it would cost to restore what is already here. The city publishes the lead line inventory and the per-line price, but the $12 billion total was worked out by reporters.

06

How Much Revenue Goes Straight to Interest Payments? [Interest-to-Total Revenues]

Comparison cities are not shown on this chart. Each reports a different mix of water, sewer, airport and other enterprise debt, so their interest figures cannot be matched to Chicago’s. Their figures are in the data download.

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Interest on all city debt, including the water, sewer and airport funds, as a percentage of Chicago's total revenue, by year. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearInterest to revenue
200310.32%
200411.42%
200510.46%
200610.49%
200710.49%
200810.82%
200911.70%
201011.79%
201112.50%
201212.09%
201312.38%
201413.66%
201516.00%
201611.27%
201713.30%
201811.08%
201910.66%
202010.48%
202110.61%
20229.34%
20238.52%
20248.50%
20257.67%
Of every dollar Chicago collects, how many cents go just to interest, before paying down any actual debt? At the 2015 peak, 16 cents of every dollar. That was the year Moody’s cut Chicago’s credit rating to junk. Borrowing got more expensive, and getting out of bank deals that the downgrade let banks cancel carried a price tag of about $200 million. A record property tax increase followed, $543 million for police and fire pensions, plus a new $9.50 monthly garbage fee.
Look closer Cheaper payments on the same debt. Pension contributions are a separate cost on top.

In 2017 the city created the Sales Tax Securitization Corporation (STSC), a separate entity that borrows against Chicago’s sales tax revenue at a better rate than the city can get on its own. Refinancing through it lowered the city’s borrowing costs. Interest is now about 7.7 cents per revenue dollar, the lowest in this series. Most of that decline came after 2021, when the interest bill fell from about $1.37 billion to $1.15 billion while revenue grew by a similar proportion. The two did roughly equal work.

Two things to keep in mind. Refinancing replaced old debt with new debt, so Chicago still owes what it borrowed. Stretching the payments over more years makes the yearly bill smaller and the total interest larger. And this chart covers only bonds and loans. Pension contributions grew from $0.59 billion in 2016 to $2.85 billion in 2025, a separate cost on top.

Vulnerability

How dependent is Chicago on outside help?

07

How Much of the City’s Revenue Comes from Grants? [Government Transfers-to-Total Revenue]

The interactive chart could not load. Every figure is in the data table that follows each chart, and in the data download under “About this data” at the bottom of the page.
Tap or hover the chart for details · Toggle cities above to compare
Program grant revenue as a percentage of Chicago's total revenue, by year, shown beside the same figure including money not tied to a specific program, mostly the city's share of state income and sales taxes. Chicago only; figures for the comparison cities are in the linked data sheet.
YearGovernment transfers to revenueIncluding money not tied to a program
200319.07%27.72%
200417.59%26.49%
200516.06%25.80%
200616.13%25.94%
200714.53%24.74%
200814.02%24.13%
200914.03%23.03%
201014.73%24.83%
201117.61%25.54%
201213.23%22.35%
201313.19%22.83%
201410.01%19.10%
20159.30%18.41%
20169.07%17.39%
20178.26%16.14%
20187.96%15.58%
20197.03%14.89%
202013.01%20.77%
20218.77%24.15%
20228.63%23.07%
20238.09%17.20%
20248.76%17.25%
20257.12%15.36%
What share of Chicago’s revenue comes from Springfield and Washington? The solid line counts grants tied to particular programs, 19% in 2003 and 7% in 2025. The dashed line adds money that isn’t tied to a program, which brings 2025 to 15%. Most of it is the city’s share of state income and sales taxes. The state collects those and passes them along under rules it sets, so they still depend on Springfield. The 2020 spike in the solid line is mostly CARES Act money, which the city counted as program grants. The 2021 and 2022 bump in the dashed line is mostly federal ARPA money, which the city counted as not tied to a program.
Why the line fell Chicago leans less on outside money because local bills went up.

Nobody had to cut grants for this line to fall. Chicago’s own revenue has more than doubled since 2003 while that money has not kept up, so it covers a smaller piece of a bigger budget every year.

The steepest drop came between 2011 and 2015, when water and sewer rates roughly doubled, with the record property tax increase and the garbage fee close behind.

That cuts both ways. Chicago is less exposed to a federal or state cut than it was in 2003, which is real protection, though residents paid for it through higher local bills.

Don't count on it Programs get cut and funding gets frozen. Only local revenue is under the city's control.
State and federal priorities change. Programs get cut, funding gets paused, administrations shift direction. The city's own audited report flags the risk. Many federal grants pay only after the city has spent the money, and new federal oversight rules in 2025 added conditions and reporting that can slow approvals and reimbursements. Operating grant revenue fell from $1.07 billion in 2024 to $769 million in 2025, which the city attributes to less reimbursable grant activity and to reviews required before grantors would pay. For fiscal 2026, at least 20 of the 25 largest U.S. cities reported budget gaps, driven by rising costs, lagging revenue and reduced federal support. The exposure runs wider than the city's own books, too. The CTA is a legally separate agency whose finances are not in this chart, and about $2 billion in federal money already approved for its Red Line extension and Red and Purple modernization was frozen in October 2025. A federal judge ordered it released in March 2026, on a temporary order while the case is decided. A financially healthy city cannot count on outside help to close its gaps. The only revenue Chicago fully controls is local.

The money comes in.
The promises keep piling up.

Chicago doesn't have to miss a bond payment to "default" on its residents. Deferred maintenance, underfunded pensions, and rising debt are already shaping what the city can and can't do for you.

Send these charts to your alderperson (look yours up by address, or browse the full City Council list) and ask:

  • Upkeep

    What would it cost to bring what we already own back to good condition?

    The city does not publish what it would cost to fix the roads, pipes and buildings it already owns. Its own capital plan says it “is not intended to be an all-inclusive inventory of the City’s capital needs.” Lead pipes alone would run about $12 billion.

  • Pensions

    Will the extra pension payment be written into city ordinance instead of decided again every year?

    Since 2023 the city has been paying more into the pension funds than state law requires, including $272 million in 2025. That is real progress on a $36.4 billion hole. It is also approved one budget at a time, so it can be trimmed or delayed.

  • Capital projects

    Will you ask what big projects cost to maintain after they are built, starting with Lake Shore Drive?

    Rebuilding the north stretch would cost an estimated $3.4 billion to build. Nobody has said what it will cost to maintain and eventually replace, which is the bill that arrives long after the ribbon cutting. No design is final yet.

  • Balancing the budget

    How much of next year’s budget rests on one-time money?

    The 2026 budget covered ongoing costs with about $233 million pulled from TIF districts, money normally reserved for development projects, plus about $450 million of borrowing. Both are one-time sources, so the same gap has to be filled again next year.

  • Outside money

    Which services in next year’s budget run on grants that are ending?

    The 2026 budget cut 282 health department positions, which the Civic Federation says were likely in large part grant-funded. Grant money has fallen from about 9% of what the city collects to about 7%.

Tell them you want a budget built on Strong Towns principles. Maintain what we have, and stop passing the bill to the next generation.

About this data

Source: Each city’s Annual Comprehensive Financial Report (ACFR), government-wide statements. Chicago’s ACFRs cover 2003–2025. Dollar figures are nominal. Six of the seven indicators are ratios, so inflation cancels out. The one real-terms comparison, for net financial position, uses annual average CPI-U: 184.0 for 2003 and 321.9 for 2025 (a partial-year average, because of the 2025 federal shutdown).

Get the data: Every indicator for all four cities, plus the population figures behind the per-resident view. Figures come from the Strong Towns Finance Decoder worksheets, one per city (Chicago’s is here). Strong Towns Chicago computed and added Chicago’s FY2025 column.

What “Chicago” covers: The City of Chicago’s reporting entity, including the Public Library and the Sales Tax Securitization Corporation. The ACFR excludes CPS, the CTA, the Park District, the Housing Authority and City Colleges as “related organizations”, meaning the city appoints their boards but has no financial accountability for them. Full list: What these numbers cover.

Why this differs from the ACFR’s headline: Net financial position leaves out roads, pipes and buildings, because the city cannot sell a water main to pay a pension. The ACFR’s own net position counts those assets, so it shows a smaller hole (−$30.5 billion at the end of 2025) and a smaller yearly change (−$1.27 billion, against −$1.59 billion here). The $322 million difference in the yearly change is the $762 million the city added in capital assets during 2025, which this measure does not count as an improvement, less the $440 million decline in deferred outflows, which it does not count as a loss. Both figures come from the same statement. This measure asks what the city could actually pay with.

Comparing cities: Chicago, Los Angeles and Houston are close structural peers. None runs schools or a county welfare system, and each owns large utilities or airports. New York differs twice over. It runs schools and social services, which with health and CUNY are about 56% of its budget. And its figures cover governmental activities only, while the other three cover the total primary government. Recomputing Chicago on New York’s basis barely moves net debt to revenue (about 2%) but moves assets to liabilities by about a third. Interest to revenue is not comparable at all, because Chicago’s figure counts enterprise interest and the others do not. On government transfers, the basis explains just 1.6 points of an 18.5-point gap. The rest is schools. Net debt to revenue is the most comparable measure and government transfers the least, and trends compare better than levels.

Fiscal years: They don’t line up. Chicago’s closes December 31 and the other three close June 30, so each comparison city’s FY2025 ends six months before Chicago’s. Los Angeles is charted from 2012 and Houston from 2009, the earliest years in the source data.

In 2025 dollars: The third toggle on the net financial position chart restates every year in 2025 dollars using the annual average CPI-U above. It answers whether the hole grew faster than prices, and it does. The 2003 gap of $9.4 billion is about $16.5 billion in today’s money, against $65.3 billion now.

Per resident: Available for net financial position, the only chart that isn’t already a ratio. Each year’s figure is divided by that year’s population. The 2020 populations are census counts between yearly estimates, which adds a slight step that year, and the 2024 figures are approximate; neither moves any line by more than a few percent. The 2025 populations are Census estimates for July 1, 2025: Chicago 2,731,585; New York 8,584,629; Los Angeles 3,869,089; Houston 2,397,315.

Pensions: Four funds: Municipal, Police, Fire and Laborers. The 28% funded ratio and $36.4 billion gap come from the FY2025 ACFR, measured December 31, 2025. Other published figures can differ slightly by measurement date or by whether retiree health benefits are included. The 2015 jump is GASB 68, a reporting change for obligations that already existed. These obligations come due over decades. Per-resident figures use the population series in the data download; the per-household figure uses 1,160,205 Chicago households (Census Bureau, 2020–2024 American Community Survey five-year estimate).

Infrastructure: Depreciation is an accounting estimate rather than a physical inspection. The denominator is the original cost of all capital assets. Leases and software subscriptions were first recorded as capital assets in 2022 and 2023, under GASB 87 and GASB 96, and are counted from those years onward. They sit at about 40% of original cost because they amortize over the lease term rather than the asset’s useful life, which lowers the measure by roughly half a point from 2022. Earlier years contain no such assets. The figure covers everything the city owns, including land and construction in progress; governmental infrastructure alone, meaning roads and bridges, stands at about 40%.

Peer median: On six charts, the middle value among New York, Los Angeles and Houston each year. It describes three other large cities. It is not a target. It is left off net financial position, where dollar totals across cities of different size would mislead.

Accessibility: Every chart has a matching data table for screen readers. If the charts fail to load, the page says so and points to those tables and the download.

This page informs public discussion and does not provide financial advice. Spot an error? Let us know.

Last updated September 2026 · Reflects the FY2025 ACFR